Before Striking Iraq

by Wallace J. Thies professor of politics The Catholic University of America

ecretary of State Albright's recent trip to the Middle East suggests that the Clinton administration is preparing for a punitive air strike against Iraq. There are, however, several reasons for expecting that the results of such an attack will be modest at best.

First, an air strike is unlikely to destroy whatever stockpile of weapons of mass destruction Iraq has amassed due to uncertainty over their location. An air strike would be aimed instead at changing Iraqi minds, by increasing the pressure on Iraq to comply with United Nations Security Council resolutions demanding free and unfettered access to suspected weapons facilities.

The United States and the United Nations have been attempting to end Iraq's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction ever since the end of the Persian Gulf war nearly seven years ago. The fact that the struggle continues unabated suggests that Saddam Hussein and his retinue are unlikely to change their minds and become virtuous members of the world community. A change of government in Baghdad is the only sure way to end Iraq's quest for weapons of mass destruction.

Second, the United States labors under two constraints that limit the steps that it can take against Iraq. On one hand, if Saddam is ousted and/or killed, how well would Iraq hold together in the aftermath? The United States' goal is to oust Saddam, but not to cause Iraq to break up. The latter could trigger a new round of warfare as Iraq's neighbors fought over the pieces.

On the other hand, even if the U.S. intelligence community knew precisely the location of Iraq's weapons stockpile, would it be prudent to target the weapons themselves, at the risk of releasing their contents into the atmosphere? Saddam Hussein may not care much about the lives of his fellow Iraqis, but democracies must adhere to a higher standard.

Third, many Iraqis - not just Saddam and his followers - consider Kuwait an artificial entity created by the British when the latter withdrew from their League of Nations mandate over territories that formerly belonged to the Ottoman Empire. Even after Saddam is gone, there will likely be an Iraq-Kuwait "problem" for many years to come.

An air strike may indeed be needed to compel Saddam to be more cooperative in his dealings with U.N. weapons inspectors, but even a successful strike could be met by continued Iraqi efforts to conceal their weapons program. The Iraqis are in effect playing a shell game with the U.N., constantly moving the evidence of what they are up to in the hope they can stay one step ahead of the inspectors. One more air strike won't end this game. At best it will bring a few grudging concessions from the Iraqi side, but the game will commence anew.

Wallace J. Thies is a professor in the Department of Politics at The Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C. 202-319-6230 (o), 301-774-1264 (h).

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